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ALL POWERFUL? HOW THE FBI’S REQUEST OF APPLE TO 
UNLOCK AN iPHONE USING THE ALL WRITS ACT FAILS THE 
NEW YORK TELEPHONE TEST 
Alyssa Zottola* 
INTRODUCTION 
Smartphones, Alexa, Google Homes, and smart watches. All are 
examples of technology that are now ubiquitous in American society. As of 
February 2019, 81% of Americans own and use a smartphone.1 However, 
smartphones are more than just communication devices: for many 
individuals, these phones contain highly personal information, ranging from 
daily schedules, private intimate conversations, to even health information.2 
With the increasing frequency of data breaches and hacking of electronic 
records,3 companies are taking steps to ensure that their systems and devices 
are secure in an effort to maintain public trust. 
To protect against these breaches, technology companies use end-to-end 
encryption; while lauded by customers, the use of end-to-end encryption has 
frustrated the government in its attempts to access data from criminals’ 
phones and other devices. With few other options, and the necessity of 
                                                                                                                           
 
* JD Candidate, University of Pittsburgh, 2021; B.A. Italian Studies; B.A. History, magna cum 
laude, University of Pittsburgh 2018. 
1 Mobile Fact Sheet: Mobile Phone Ownership Over Time, PEW RSCH. CTR.: INFO. & TECH. 
(June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
2 Apple iOS Health, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/health/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). 
3 Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States 
from 2005 to 1st Half 2020, STATISTA (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-
breaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/. 
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smartphones as a source of information in criminal investigations, the 
government has turned, with increasing frequency,4 to the little known All 
Writs Act (“AWA”), to try and force companies, such as Apple and Google,5 
to unlock personal devices or provide data from devices against the 
companies’ will.6 
The potential consequences of allowing the government to manipulate 
the AWA to serve its purpose of conscripting private companies to work for 
the government are staggering. There is nothing within the AWA to suggest 
that the government would be limited in using the Act just for the purpose of 
unlocking phones.7 On at least sixty occasions,8 both Apple and Google have 
been forced to provide technical assistance to agencies such as the FBI, 
Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Postal Inspection Services,9 
ranging from bypassing phones’ lock screens to extracting the data from 
devices.10 The open-ended nature of the AWA suggests that the government 
could potentially use the Act as a means to force other private companies to 
perform similar actions.11 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 As of March of 2016, there were at least approximately seventy-six requests; the ACLU, through 
their own investigation, uncovered sixty-three confirmed cases involving requested uses of the AWA, as 
well as one potential case in Massachusetts (due to a lack of publicly available information, the ACLU 
was unable to positively confirm the use of the AWA), and Apple identified twelve pending cases where 
there was a request to use the AWA. Eliza Sweren-Becker, This Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight 
Was About Much More Than One Phone, ACLU (Mar. 30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
privacy-technology/internet-privacy/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-more-one-
phone?redirect=blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-more-one-phone. 
5 All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/ 
privacy-technology/internet-privacy/all-writs-act-orders-assistance-tech-companies (last visited Jan. 23, 
2020). 
6 See Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2888–89 (2018). 
7 The FBI has not only used the AWA to force Apple to unlock phones: it also used the AWA to 
unlock an iPad to access an online internet account. Jose Pagliery, Here are the Places the Feds are Using 
a Controversial Law to Unlock Phones, CNN BUS. (Mar. 30, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2016/03/30/technology/phones-all-writs-act/index.html. 
8 All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies, supra note 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 During a murder investigation in 2015, the government asked Amazon, using the AWA, to 
provide data from an Amazon Alexa Echo device. While the suspect eventually gave the government the 
Alexa willingly, and the government was able to access the data without the help of Amazon, this suggests 
that the AWA could be used for more than just unlocking cell phones. Samuel, supra note 6, at 2874–75. 
Google has also previously been subject to requests by the government to unlock Android devices 
pursuant to the AWA. All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies, supra note 5. 
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Perhaps the most recognizable instance of such attempted action is the 
FBI’s bid to force Apple to unlock the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone. In 
In re Search of An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search 
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203,12 
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym13 signed an order, pursuant to the AWA, to 
compel Apple to supply the FBI with the necessary technical assistance to 
access the iPhone.14 The order was eventually withdrawn for mootness, as 
the FBI was able to access the information without the assistance of Apple.15 
The well-publicized legal bid catapulted the AWA into the public eye, 
creating a large public debate about whether Apple and other technology 
companies should be forced to comply with such orders to provide technical 
assistance in law enforcement investigations.16 More importantly, the dispute 
between the FBI and Apple highlights the inappropriateness of the AWA as 
an instrument in a criminal investigation. 
There is little case law that specifically addresses the use of the AWA 
as a tool to compel private companies into assisting the government in 
investigations. Therefore, the precedential AWA case, United States v. New 
York Telephone Co. (“New York Telephone”),17 provides crucial guidance to 
courts in interpreting the AWA and what they must evaluate when 
determining whether or not to grant the request. The Court in New York 
Telephone provides three elements for consideration (what the author refers 
to hereinafter as the “New York Telephone test”) to guide courts in evaluating 
AWA requests. The elements are as follows: (1) the degree of separation 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 In re Search of An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black 
Lexus IS300, Ca. License Plate 35KGD203, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter In re Search 
of An Apple iPhone]. 
13 See Eric Lichtblau, Judge Tells Apple to Help Unlock iPhone Used by San Bernardino Gunman, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/judge-tells-apple-to-help-unlock-
san-bernardino-gunmans-iphone.html. 
14 Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 2, In re Search of An Apple iPhone, 
2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 2016) [hereinafter Order Compelling Apple]. 
15 Order Vacating February 16, 2016 Order at 1, In re Search of An Apple iPhone, 2016 WL 618401 
[hereinafter Order Vacating]. 
16 Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San Bernardino 




17 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
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between the third-party and the controversy;18 (2) the burden the request 
places upon the third-party;19 (3) the ability to complete the task without the 
third party’s assistance.20 
This Paper assesses the AWA in the framework of the San Bernardino 
investigation and the subsequent legal battle. It argues that the decision to 
grant the order, pursuant to the AWA, to compel Apple to provide technical 
assistance was improperly decided. Furthermore, it argues that the AWA 
should not be used in future criminal investigations to compel technology 
companies’ assistance. This Paper proposes that the proper solution to the 
problem must balance the need for information in a criminal investigation 
against a company’s right to be free from compelled service. Such solution 
is legislation with input from both the technology industry and federal 
(perhaps even local) law enforcement agencies that allows for the agencies 
to have access to data and conduct a proper investigation, pursuant to a lawful 
warrant or subpoena, while also ensuring the technological security of the 
American people. The author argues that many of the factors assessed in the 
San Bernardino case about the burden, degree of separation, and ability to 
complete the task without third-party assistance were not unique to that 
litigation and would weigh against the government in future applications for 
use of the AWA. 
Part I of this Paper provides a provides a timeline of events for the San 
Bernardino shooting. Part II gives a history and legal framework of the 
AWA, focusing on the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Telephone, 
which provides the analytical framework for assessing AWA requests. Part 
III describes the history of the AWA, with subsections describing the New 
York Telephone case and the New York Telephone test (as applied to the San 
Bernardino litigation). Part IV analyzes proposed solutions and Part V 
provides a conclusion. 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Id. at 174. 
19 Id. at 175. 
20 Id. 
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I. THE SAN BERNARDINO SHOOTING 
On December 2, 2015, at 10:59 a.m.,21 eighty members of the San 
Bernardino Environmental Health Department gathered in a large conference 
room at the Inland Regional Center (IRC) for a training event22 were gunned 
down and massacred by two shooters dressed in all black.23 The shooters 
were in and out of the room within two to three minutes.24 In total, thirty-six 
people were shot, twenty-two people were injured, and fourteen people were 
killed.25 The suspects, later identified as Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen 
Malik,26 were killed in a shoot-out with police officers and FBI agents hours 
later within a suburban area of San Bernardino in their rental car.27 Within 
the rental car, agents found the now infamous iPhone28—later at the center 
of the controversy between the FBI and Apple. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE ALL WRITS ACT 
A. History of the All Writs Act 
The AWA, in its current form, states: “The Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate 
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.”29 The current form of the Act has its origins in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which helped delineate the powers given to federal 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 RICK BRAZIEL ET AL., BRINGING CALM TO CHAOS: A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE SAN 
BERNARDINO PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER 2, 2015, TERRORIST SHOOTING INCIDENT AT 
THE INLAND REGIONAL CENTER 25 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/891996/download. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 27. 
25 Id. at 25. 
26 See id. at 26, 37; Adam Nagourney et al., San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14; Two 
Suspects Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-
shooting.html. 
27 BRAZIEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 38–40. 
28 Josh Gerstein & David Perera, Feds Get Order to Force Apple to Unlock San Bernardino 
Shooter’s Phone, POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/ 
2016/02/san-bernardino-apple-shooters-219357. 
29 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018). 
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district courts in the United States.30 The two relevant sections of the Act, 
Sections 13 and 14, provide the basis for the current iteration of the AWA, 
and were combined (and subsequently codified) in the Judicial Code in 1948 
to form 28 U.S.C. § 1651.31 Section 13 provided, in pertinent part, that the 
district courts may issue writs of mandamus.32 Section 14, which remained 
largely the same in the 1948 amendment, dictates that the courts of the United 
States “shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, . . . and 
all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary 
for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law.”33 The only major change between the two 
versions of the AWA is the removal of the phrase “not specially provided for 
by statute” in the 1948 codification.34 There is very little legislative history 
regarding the removal of the phrase “not specifically provided for by 
statute”;35 however, the interpretation of the AWA remains the same 
regardless of the change in wording.36 
B. New York Telephone: The Case 
Any attempted use of the AWA by the government to compel assistance 
from third-parties in criminal investigations is evaluated using the three-part 
New York Telephone test.37 In New York Telephone, the FBI applied for, and 
received, a warrant to install a pen register (a type of listening device) on the 
telephone line of a suspected illegal gambling operation.38 New York 
Telephone Company was to supply any and all necessary technical assistance 
so that the pen register could be installed unobtrusively and to lease a 
telephone line to the FBI, allowing the FBI to listen to the conversations at a 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Jennifer X. Luo, Decoding Pandora’s Box: All Writs Act and Separation of Powers, 56 HARV. 
J. LEGIS. 257, 261–62 (2019). 
31 Id. at 262. 
32 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80–81. 
33 Id. at 81–82. 
34 Luo, supra note 30, at 262. 
35 Id. at 262–63. 
36 See id. at 263–64. 
37 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–76 (1977). 
38 Id. at 161–62. 
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remote location;39 the FBI was to compensate New York Telephone for these 
services at the standard monetary rate.40 
New York Telephone agreed to help the FBI install the pen register but 
refused to lease the FBI a telephone line.41 New York Telephone moved to 
quash the order requiring their forced assistance with the pen register, 
arguing the AWA did not give the District Court the authority to issue such 
a writ.42 However, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
disagreed, finding that the AWA and its inherent powers gave the Court the 
authority to force New York Telephone to comply with the order.43 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
District Court’s decision, noting that the District Court had the power to 
authorize pen registers but abused its discretion by finding that the AWA 
authorized the courts to force New York Telephone to provide technological 
assistance.44 In so holding, the Court of Appeals “expressed concern that: 
‘such an order [for compelled assistance] could establish a most undesirable, 
if not dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to 
impose unwilling aid on private third parties’ and that ‘there is no assurance 
that the court will always be able to protect [third parties] from excessive or 
overzealous Government activity or compulsion.’”45 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision.46 The 
majority opinion, authored by Justice White, did address the Court of 
Appeals’ concern regarding the potential for unintended consequences, 
noting that “[w]e agree that the power of federal courts to impose duties upon 
third parties is not without limits; unreasonable burdens may not be 
imposed.”47 However, in the same breath, they implicitly repudiate such 
concerns by stating: “[t]he power conferred by the Act extends, under 
appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original 
action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 Id. at 161. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 162. 
42 Id. at 163. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 164. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 178. 
47 Id. at 172. 
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implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice.”48 
Although Justice Stewart agreed that the District Court had the authority to 
order the installation of the pen register,49 he joined in Part II of Justice 
Stevens’50 more convincing dissent. 
Justice Stevens does a more faithful job of using the text and the history 
of the AWA to interpret the proper role and use of the statute. He highlights 
how “[t]he statute does not contain, and has never before been interpreted as 
containing, the open-ended grant of authority to the federal courts that 
today’s decision purports to uncover.”51 Instead, he notes that, “in the 
language of the statute itself, there are two fundamental limitations on its 
scope. The purpose of any order authorized by the Act must be to aid the 
court in the exercise of its jurisdiction; and the means must be analogous to 
a common-law writ.”52 
C. New York Telephone: The Test 
Following the Court’s decision in New York Telephone, any case 
involving the use of the AWA to compel third-party assistance with the 
execution of an order should be assessed against the elements outlined in New 
York Telephone, in what the author refers to as the New York Telephone test.53 
The test uses three elements as a guide when examining the facts of a specific 
case in determining whether or not the court should use its power under the 
AWA to grant an order compelling service. The elements are as follows: 
(1) the degree of separation between the third-party and the controversy;54 
(2) the burden the request places upon the third-party;55 and (3) the ability to 
complete the task without the third party’s assistance.56 
Taking each element in turn, the Court in New York Telephone first 
reasoned that New York Telephone was not too far removed from the 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 Id. at 173–74. 
49 Id. at 178. 
50 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.). 
51 Id. at 187. 
52 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
53 See id. at 174–75. 
54 Id. at 174. 
55 Id. at 175. 
56 Id. 
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controversy “that its assistance could not permissibly be compelled” because 
there was sufficient evidence to suggest the company’s facilities were used 
to perpetuate a criminal enterprise.57 More importantly, New York Telephone 
was a “highly regulated public utility,” for which the Court argued “it hardly 
can be contended that the Company . . . had a substantial interest in not 
providing assistance.”58 Regarding the issue of the burden placed on New 
York Telephone, the Court believed that the financial compensation and the 
“minimal effort” required by New York Telephone to comply with the order 
did not place an undue burden on the company.59 Finally, the Court notes that 
there is no way the FBI would have been able to conduct its surveillance from 
a remote location without the assistance of New York Telephone, as the FBI 
conducted an extensive search and was unable to find a suitable location for 
such surveillance without New York Telephone’s assistance in providing the 
leased line.60 
As applied to the San Bernardino dispute, based on the totality of these 
factors, it is clear that the use of the AWA amounts to improper compulsion 
of assistance from Apple by the FBI. It is a prime example of what the 
majority in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the dissent in New York 
Telephone feared would occur:61 unfettered government ability to force third 
parties to become unwilling government agents. Using the dispute between 
Apple and the FBI over the San Bernardino shooter’s phone as a case study, 
it is clear that the AWA is an improper tool to access data on encrypted 
phones as, taken together, the three elements of the New York Telephone test 
balance in favor of Apple rather than the FBI. 
D. Applying the New York Telephone Test to the Apple v. FBI Dispute 
1. Procedural history of the San Bernardino Apple v. FBI dispute 
A note about the procedural history of the case In re Search of An Apple 
iPhone (i.e., the San Bernardino case). The FBI applied ex parte to 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Id. at 174. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 175. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 187. 
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Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym62 on February 16, 2016 for an order compelling 
Apple to aid the FBI in unlocking the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone.63 The 
Magistrate granted the order on the same day, finding that the U.S. Attorney 
had shown good cause for the order.64 The order gave Apple five days 
following its issuance to apply to the Magistrate Court for relief if “Apple 
believes that compliance with this Order would be unduly burdensome.”65 
Apple responded with a Motion in Opposition nine days later on February 25, 
2016, outlining why it opposed the Order compelling its assistance to the 
FBI.66 A hearing was set for March 22, 2016 to hear arguments on the case.67 
However, on March 29, the order was vacated by Judge Pym for mootness, 
as the FBI was able to gain access to the phone without Apple’s assistance.68 
Therefore, unlike in New York Telephone, there was not a full-blown court 
case, comprising oral arguments on motions, cross examination of witness, 
or an opinion from Judge Pym about her reasoning for granting the order and 
reasoning for her verdict (if the case were heard as a bench trial). The most 
insight comes from the original order granting the request, pursuant to the 
AWA, to compel Apple’s assistance. 
The February 16, 2016 order does not use the specific elements of the 
New York Telephone test; the only reference to the elements of the test is the 
judge allowing Apple to apply for relief if it “believes that compliance with 
this Order would be unduly burdensome.”69 The bulk of the order details the 
type of technical assistance Apple was to provide, the methods by which 
Apple could comply with the order, how Apple should advise the government 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Lichtblau, supra note 13. 
63 Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search 
at 1, In re Search of An Apple iPhone, 2016 WL 618401 [hereinafter Government’s Ex Parte Application]. 
64 Order Compelling Apple, supra note 14, at 1, 3. 
65 Id. at 3. 
66 Declaration of Nicola T. Hanna in Support of Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling 
Apple Inc. to Assist in Search, and Opposition to Government Motion to Compel Assistance at 1, 7, In re 
Search of An Apple iPhone, 2016 WL 618401 [hereinafter Declaration of Nicola T. Hanna]. 
67 Elizabeth Weise, Apple, FBI to Head to Court March 22, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2016, 
11:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/19/apple-fbi--court-march-22-riverside-
march-22/80635402/. 
68 Order Vacating, supra note 15, at 1; Alina Selyukh, The FBI Has Successfully Unlocked the 
iPhone Without Apple’s Help, NPR (Mar. 28, 2016). 
69 Order Compelling Apple, supra note 14, at 3. 
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regarding the cost of “providing this service,” and releasing Apple from the 
responsibility of holding on to a copy of the data.70 
While the litigation between Apple and the FBI in the San Bernardino 
case did not produce an opinion, or make it to the stage of hearing arguments 
on the motions, a previous dispute between Apple and the FBI in the Eastern 
District of New York did produce an opinion.71 Importantly, the opinion was 
not issued until after the FBI applied, using the AWA, for Apple’s assistance 
in unlocking the phone in California.72 This author purposefully chose to 
focus on the California case, instead of the New York case, because the 
iPhone in the San Bernardino case was running on iOS 9,73 meaning that 
Apple could not break into the phone, as phones using iOS 8 and above 
require that the user know the password to access the data;74 Apple is 
incapable of accessing the data on the phone without the password.75 In 
comparison, the iPhone in the New York case ran on iOS 7,76 which Apple 
could theoretically “break into”77 without creating the backdoor the FBI 
argued it needed in the San Bernardino case.78 As such, the legal arguments 
about the elements of the New York Telephone test, while similar, still are 
different, as Apple would be attempting something it has never done before.79 
The New York opinion, however, does provide excellent analysis of why the 
AWA is the inappropriate instrument to force Apple to assist the FBI.80 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Id. at 2–3. 
71 In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this 
Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
72 The AWA order in the San Bernardino shooting was issued on February 16, 2016. The Opinion 
was issued on February 29, 2016. 
73 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Government’s Ex Parte Application, supra note 63, at 
4 [hereinafter Memorandum of Points and Authorities]. 
74 Declaration of Erik Neuenschwander in Support of Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order 
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist in Search, and Opposition to Government Motion to Compel Assistance 
at 3, In re Search of An Apple iPhone, 2016 WL 618401 [hereinafter Declaration of Erik 
Neuenschwander]. 
75 Id. 
76 In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 345. 
77 Transcript of Argument at 7, 58–59, In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist in the Execution 
of a Search Warrant Issued by the Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Argument]; Joel Rose, The Seeds of Apple’s Standoff With the DOJ May Have Been Sown in Brooklyn, 
NPR (Feb. 22, 2016, 5:16 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467602161/the-seeds-of-apples-
standoff-with-doj-may-have-been-sown-in-brooklyn. 
78 See Rose, supra note 77. 
79 Declaration of Erik Neuenschwander, supra note 74, at 10. 
80 See In re Order Requiring Apple Inc. to Assist, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 364–76. 
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2. The New York Telephone Test applied to the San Bernardino 
Dispute 
As applied to the facts of the San Bernardino dispute between Apple and 
the FBI, the first factor of the test (the degree of separation between the third-
party and the controversy)81 clearly indicates that the use of the AWA is 
inappropriate. Apple is far removed from the controversy between the FBI 
and the San Bernardino shooter. The only connection between the two is that 
Apple sold the phone used by the shooter. Arguing that a retailer who sells 
hundreds of millions of devices82 is close enough to a controversy, just 
because it sold a device used by a drug dealer or a mass shooter, has 
unimaginable consequences. Companies such as Apple and Google would 
find themselves entangled in millions of such controversies. 
However, the Court in New York Telephone argued that the mere fact a 
criminal enterprise used New York Telephone’s facilities was enough to 
connect the company to the controversy.83 The author believes that such an 
interpretation is incorrect, as it potentially subjects large companies, such as 
Apple, to an unfathomable number of requests for assistance. The author’s 
view is also supported by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein, who noted in 
the New York dispute between Apple and the FBI, “Apple is too far removed 
from [the defendant in the New York case’s] criminal conduct to have any 
obligation to assist the DEA’s investigation. To the extent that Feng used his 
iPhone in committing crimes, he used his own property, not Apple’s.”84 
Apple is a retailer that simply sold the device used in the offense; its 
involvement in the crime ended at the point of sale, as it no longer controls 
the device. Further separating Apple from the San Bernardino incident is the 
fact that the employer, not the shooter himself, was the owner of the phone,85 
meaning that Apple was not even directly responsible for selling the phone 
to the shooter. 
Further distinguishing the separation between New York Telephone and 
its controversy, as compared to Apple and the San Bernardino shooting, is 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174. 
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that New York Telephone was a “highly regulated public utility with a duty 
to serve the public.”86 Apple is not bound by the same constrictions: its 
primary goal is, arguably, keeping its customers happy, thereby ensuring a 
steady revenue stream. While Apple is not a private company, rather a public 
company with shareholders,87 it still does not owe the same duty that is 
assigned to a “highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the 
public.”88 Therefore, Apple is far enough removed from the controversy that 
the government and FBI’s request fails the first prong of the New York 
Telephone test. 
The second prong, the burden the request places upon the third party,89 
again clearly weighs in Apple’s favor, as the burden of complying with the 
government’s request is unfathomably high. Measuring whether something 
is reasonable or not should not just be an economic calculation; one must 
examine all of the potential consequences of coercing Apple to supply 
technical assistance against its will against the totality of the circumstances. 
In other words, the court should weigh all of the potential consequences of 
ordering Apple to comply with the court order and supply technical 
assistance to the FBI against its will. Weighed against the totality of the 
circumstances, it is clear that the coerced assistance is an unreasonable 
burden on Apple. 
Financially speaking, the cost of the requested remedy is likely 
astronomical; Apple would need to hire paralegals, engineers, and additional 
Apple law enforcement compliance officers, not to mention the cost of labor 
in designing and writing the code itself.90 Apple’s total sales in 2016 
measured around $214.23 billion;91 the theoretical cost of complying with 
such an order is unlikely to deplete Apple’s coffers. However, as Erik 
Neuenschwander, Apple’s Manager of User Policy, notes, this would be the 
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first time that anyone, specifically Apple, has attempted such a task.92 It is 
likely that unforeseen complications will result in higher than anticipated 
costs. 
Beyond the pure financial cost to Apple of providing assistance, the 
manpower required for such endeavor is unduly burdensome. As both 
Apple’s Manager of its Global Privacy and Law Enforcement Compliance 
Team,93 as well as its Manager of User Policy94 pontificated, to complete the 
requested task, Apple would need to dedicate six to ten engineers specifically 
to the project for a span of time ranging from two to four weeks.95 In addition, 
should the request be granted, a team of employees ranging from paralegals 
to engineers would need to be hired and dedicated to specifically handle all 
AWA requests.96 Further adding to the burden, what the government is 
asking Apple to do is something that has never been attempted before.97 The 
estimates regarding the amount of time, manpower, and costs are all 
hypotheticals, as is the idea that any attempt to decrypt the phone would be 
successful. If a technology company, like Apple or Google, is forced to 
supply technological assistance to the government, the burden analysis must 
also take into account First Amendment considerations. 
In cases where Apple (or another company) would be forced to build a 
“backdoor” into its system, there are First Amendment and compelled speech 
considerations:98 Should an individual be forced to create a code, which some 
appellate courts have ruled is speech,99 that they vehemently protest against? 
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Furthermore, while the government argues that the “backdoor” would only 
be used on the target phone,100 is there a way to ensure that this remains the 
case? Regardless of the hypotheticals, the greatest burden that the compelled 
action places upon Apple is the abhorrent precedent it sets. 
Domestically, there are numerous requests of Apple and Google to 
unlock devices.101 Apple previously provided technical assistance to law 
enforcement agencies in accessing devices (using already available methods 
and subject to warrants or subpoenas);102 however, as illustrated in the New 
York dispute between Apple and the FBI over unlocking an unrelated iPhone, 
creating a “backdoor” would open the flood gates for request for 
assistance.103 It is not beyond the stretch of the imagination that, should a 
court enforce the order, pursuant to the AWA, compelling Apple to provide 
technical assistance to the FBI, that those seventy requests104 would become 
a veritable tsunami of requests that would consume the company. Such 
scenario is foreshadowed in the statements of Manhattan District Attorney 
Cyrus Vance, who insinuated that he would use such precedent to force 
Apple to help unlock the (at that time) 423 inaccessible phones105 connected 
to criminal cases in his jurisdiction. 
Beyond Apple, it requires no stretch of the imagination to see how 
another tech company, perhaps Microsoft or WhatsApp, could be placed in 
the same position as Apple if an order pursuant to the AWA is granted and 
enforced. After the FBI was able to access the data on the San Bernardino 
iPhone (without the assistance of Apple), a Department of Justice 
spokeswoman implied that the precedent of Judge Pym granting the order, 
although not enforcing it, would be used to force tech companies into action 
“through the court system when cooperation fails.”106 
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Looking beyond the domestic frontier, however, one could argue that if 
the United States government could successfully compel Apple to create a 
“backdoor” for an iPhone, other countries—perhaps those that are notorious 
for spying on their own citizens—would feel emboldened to ask that such a 
feature be included as a standard feature on all phones prior to sale in their 
respective countries. 
The use of the AWA to compel a company like Apple into government 
service to forcefully decrypt the phone would set an appalling precedent that 
would inundate it with requests for assistance from prosecutorial and 
governmental agencies and divert its efforts away from business and instead 
towards forced government service. The combined monetary and 
precedential effects of forcing Apple to unlock the phone at the behest of the 
government demonstrates that the government’s request fails the second 
prong of the New York Telephone test (whether the request places an undue 
burden on the third party)107 and places an undue burden on Apple. 
The third and final prong of the New York Telephone test is assessing 
whether the government could successfully accomplish its task without 
assistance from the third party.108 There is a strong argument that the 
government could have accessed the data without the assistance of Apple. In 
the oral argument of the New York dispute between Apple and the FBI, Judge 
Orenstein noted that in another case, the government asserted that it was able 
to unlock the defendant’s phone that was running on a later version of iOS.109 
Even if, arguendo, the government was unable to use the technology alluded 
to in the other case addressed by Judge Orenstein, there were alternative 
methods available to the government that would have allowed them to access 
the data without the assistance of Apple, meaning that the government’s 
request still fails the third prong of the New York Telephone test. 
While the New York Telephone test dictates that the reviewing court 
must consider whether the government would be able to accomplish its goal 
without the assistance of the third-party, the author argues it should also take 
into account whether the government has made a good-faith effort to achieve 
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its goal before resorting to the AWA. If such consideration were applied to 
the litigation in the San Bernardino shooting, then the FBI’s request would 
clearly fail the third prong of the test. The FBI’s actions hindered the smooth 
accessing of data and necessitated the invocation of the AWA. The FBI 
requested that the shooter’s employer, the San Bernardino County Public 
Health Department (“SBCPHD”), change the iCloud password associated 
with the shooter’s account.110 If the FBI had not ordered the SBCPHD to 
change the iCloud password on the shooter’s iPhone, it is possible that the 
government would have been able to recover the data without the help from 
Apple.111 
Furthermore, a lack of communication between divisions in the FBI 
resulted in delayed attempts by other divisions within the FBI (who were 
directly involved with the San Bernardino shooting investigation) to contact 
their vendors about a potential solution.112 The FBI was unaware, at the time 
of the original filing of the AWA request, that one of its divisions within the 
investigative branch had contacts who could be solicited to help with 
unlocking the iPhone;113 however, the FBI was aware that the division was 
reaching out to its contacts at the time the FBI was scheduled to argue against 
Apple’s Motion to Dismiss. As such, the information should have debased 
the FBI’s claim that it was unable to access the information on the shooter’s 
iPhone without Apple’s help.114 
Taken together, it is clear that the New York Telephone test elements 
((1) the degree of separation between the third-party and the controversy;115 
(2) the burden the request places upon the third-party;116 (3) the ability to 
complete the task without the third party’s assistance)117 support the 
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conclusion that the use of the AWA to compel Apple’s assistance was 
improper (and would be improper in the future). The distance between Apple 
and the controversy118 (the San Bernardino shooting) is staggering: Apple is 
a retailer of devices and sells hundreds of millions of devices each year.119 
To say that it is connected to a controversy because one of its devices was 
used in a crime would potentially subject Apple to hundreds of millions of 
legal disputes, which logically could not be the case. What distinguishes 
Apple from the New York Telephone Company is that New York Telephone 
Company was “a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the 
public,”120 while Apple is a public company121 with a primary responsibility 
of ensuring the financial stability of its stock for its shareholders. 
Looking at the second prong, which asks whether the request places an 
unreasonable burden on the third party,122 it is readily apparent that the FBI’s 
request placed an unreasonable burden upon Apple when it demanded Apple 
to make a backdoor for the shooter’s phone. The precedent of granting and 
enforcing the order is in and of itself an undue burden on Apple. 
Domestically, Apple would likely face a veritable tidal wave of requests from 
other law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies (notably the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s office),123 in effect transforming Apple from a technology 
retail company into a government pawn. While more tangential and less of a 
burden, but still deserving of consideration, is the effect of the invocation and 
enforcement of an order under AWA to compel other technology companies 
to assist the government. 
While the government vehemently expressed that only the target phone 
and Apple would be subject to the writ,124 this clearly is a farce. Google also 
had received requests to unlock devices,125 pursuant to the AWA, prior to the 
San Bernardino litigation, and the FBI and other prosecutorial agencies’ 
comments following the government’s success in unlocking the iPhone 
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suggest that the government would not hesitate to use the AWA in a future 
dispute between a tech company and government agency.126 What the FBI 
asked of Apple in the San Bernardino litigation, and potentially in future 
litigation, is an unreasonable demand upon the company. 
Finally, the third prong of the test asks whether the government would 
be able to accomplish its task without the assistance of the third-party.127 
There is evidence to indicate that the FBI could have accessed the data on the 
San Bernardino shooter’s phone without the assistance of Apple.128 Had the 
FBI not requested the SBCPHD change the iCloud password on the shooter’s 
phone, it is possible that the Bureau could have accessed the information 
without having to even ask for Apple’s assistance.129 Furthermore, there is 
reason to believe that other government agencies potentially possessed 
software that could be used to unlock the shooter’s phone.130 Similarly, had 
the FBI engaged in better communication within its own departments, it 
would have realized at an earlier date that its elite cyber unit, the ROU, had 
the capability of procuring contractors to unlock the phone.131 
Using the facts specific to the San Bernardino litigation, it is clear that 
the government’s request to use the AWA to unlock the shooter’s phone fails 
the New York Telephone test. Any future scenarios in which a technology 
company’s assistance is requested by a government agency would have to be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis; however, certain elements that weighed 
against the government in the San Bernardino dispute would still weigh 
against the government in future disputes. 
Apple is still far removed from the controversy and, unlike New York 
Telephone, which was a public utility,132 is a publicly traded company133 with 
a duty to its shareholders rather than the public. Other technology companies 
potentially subject to the use of the AWA in the future, such as Alphabet 
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(Google’s parent company),134 Microsoft,135 or Amazon,136 are publicly 
traded companies that have duties to their shareholders rather than the public. 
Had the government enforced the court’s order and compelled Apple to 
create a “back-door,” it would have had a chilling domino effect upon the 
technology industry. 
There is nothing to suggest that the government would stop with Apple 
in its campaign to conscript the technology industry in its crusade to fight 
encryption; in fact, there is significant evidence to suggest that the opposite 
is true.137 Such effect would potentially have the practical result of stymieing 
development of greater and stronger encryption methods, the net effect of 
which is the endangering not only the average American citizen but also 
members of our intelligence communities and armed forces. The precedential 
effect of forcing technology companies, pursuant to the AWA, to either 
unlock devices or decrypt data has potential serious international 
consequences. If, domestically, the United States government can force 
Apple or other companies to unlock devices, what is to stop foreign countries 
from forcing these companies to install backdoors and mechanism to monitor 
its citizens communications? 
It is unclear whether the FBI (or other government agencies) would be 
able to access information using the same method the FBI did to access the 
information on the San Bernardino shooter’s phone. Following the dispute 
between Apple and the FBI, two companies have emerged that have 
specialized in creating devices that allow law enforcement agencies to access 
encrypted phones: Israeli forensic firm Cellebrite138 and Grayshift, a 
company allegedly run by experienced U.S. security contractors and a former 
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Apple engineer.139 While Apple and other companies have drafted updates to 
its software that render these decoding devices useless,140 companies like 
Cellebrite have found other ways to break the encryption.141 Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the government would be able to meet the third element of 
the New York Telephone test, the ability of the government to accomplish its 
goal without the assistance of the third party,142 and successfully compel a 
future tech company’s service. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The security of a nation and the privacy of its citizens must be balanced 
to ensure a healthy democracy. Government agencies should have access to 
encrypted data, pursuant to a lawful warrant or subpoena, in order to combat 
crime and conduct a proper investigation. But forcing technology companies, 
as the FBI attempted, under the mantle of the AWA, into the service of the 
government to forcibly decrypt or access a device is not the proper solution. 
Cooperation between the technology sector and legislature is needed to draft 
proper legislation that ensures limited, legal access to devices to further a 
proper investigation. 
The AWA is not the proper vehicle for such access. Its vagueness, while 
proper for its role as a gap-filling measure,143 makes it improper for the type 
of use the government intends: an order that gives the government carte 
blanche to force companies to comply in whatever way, shape or form with 
its demands. The lack of determinable limits means that the government 
could try and extend the use of the AWA beyond decrypting devices into 
other spheres. The government’s patience with companies like Apple is 
wearing thin,144 and rightfully so: the companies need to be part of a solution 
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to a problem that is not going away anytime soon. Such compromise is not 
inconceivable; Apple allegedly backed off of an idea to encrypt iCloud 
backups after learning from the FBI the potential difficulties it would cause 
to law enforcement investigations.145 Key to any viable solution will be 
cooperation and compromise between the government and the technology 
industry. 
This author does not possess the technological expertise to offer a 
potential technological solution to the problem. This author does argue, 
however, that the creation of backdoors, regardless of whether it is for one 
device or fifty, is not the appropriate answer to this difficult problem. It is 
expected that the solution will involve a technical aspect; however, 
backdoors should not be included or considered. What this Paper does 
suggest is that a practical, legislative response is needed to best address the 
issue. Reliance on a case that was decided before the technology involved 
was even conceived is not the appropriate way to tackle changing technology 
and develop a jurisprudence that can grow as our knowledge of technology 
grows. Enacting a statue or act with input from the technology industry will 
allow for the creation of legislation that is most adept at tackling issues, such 
as accessing encrypted devices, which is equitable and fair. 
Such legislation potentially could take the form of an act like the 
Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), which 
requires telecommunication services and providers to maintain a certain level 
of access for law enforcement to access data when necessary.146 Any piece 
of legislation should include a mechanism that allows for prompt judicial 
review of a decision which allows for access to an encrypted device and use 
the factors set out in New York Telephone as a guide for weighing whether 
the requested assistance is reasonable and fair and whether the entity’s 
assistance is really needed. 
                                                                                                                           
 
145 Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Apple Dropped Plan for Encrypting Backups After FBI Complained—
Sources, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-
exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT. 
146 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FCC (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.fcc 
.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-and-licensing-division/general/communications-
assistance. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Technology is ever evolving. From self-driving cars to smartphones, it 
is an integral part of our lives with an ever-increasing presence. However, as 
companies seek to increase the security of our devices, the government seeks 
to have easier access to the devices and data. With increasing frequency, the 
government has turned to the little known and arcane All Writs Act to try and 
compel companies such as Apple147 to unlock seized devices. While law 
enforcement agencies have every right to have access to the data, pursuant to 
a valid search warrant, the AWA is the wrong vehicle to facilitate access to 
the device. Using the three-prong New York Telephone test, with the facts 
from the San Bernardino litigation as an example, it is clear that the 
government’s request fails the test, illustrating how the AWA is the improper 
vehicle. 
To ensure that the government can achieve access to seized devices that 
are otherwise inaccessible due to encryption or passcodes, the legislature and 
technology industry need to come together and work on a potential solution. 
Any solution must be agreeable to both sides and allows the government to 
have the access it needs while still preserving the technological security of 
the American people. 
The battle between the FBI and Apple is far from over. As recently as 
January 7, 2020, the FBI is demanding Apple’s assistance in unlocking the 
phone of the suspected terrorist who went on a shooting rampage at a Florida 
Naval base.148 Americans as a society value freedom, democracy, and 
privacy. The debate over “backdoors,” end-to-end encryption, and 
government access to data will not be easy but it must be done (and soon) to 
create a solution acceptable to both parties before it is too late. 
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